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Abstract 
We survey the recent literature on the eﬀects of active labor market policies 
on individual labor market outcomes like employment and income, for adult 
female individuals without work in European countries. We consider skill­
training programs, monitoring and sanctions, job search assistance, and 
employment subsidies. The results are remarkably uniform across studies. 
We relate the results to the relevant level of female labor force participation. 
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1 1  Introduction 
During the past decades, female labor force participation has risen in most Eu­
ropean countries. Nevertheless, there are still substantial diﬀerences in partici­
pation across countries. Moreover, women are typically over-represented among 
the unemployed. Because of this, active labor market polices are potentially very 
important to bring women into employment, and to increase their income levels. 
Such policies are not speciﬁcally designed for women, and many evaluation stud­
ies do not address the issue to what extent the eﬀects for women diﬀer from the 
eﬀects for men. 
In this paper we survey the existing literature on the eﬀects of active labor 
market policies on female individual labor market outcomes like employment and 
income.  We  consider  training  programs,  monitoring  and  sanctions,  job  search 
assistance, adult education, and employment subsidies. We focus on European 
countries.  High  labor  market  frictions  and  labor  market  inﬂexibility  have  led 
to  relatively  high  average unemployment  durations  and  low  wage  and  income 
inequality. Accordingly, we use a dynamic job search framework to interpret the 
results. 
Since a number of years, the EU itself has been concerned about female labor 
market outcomes. In 1997 the EU laid down its so-called “European Employment 
Strategy”. This set of policy objectives and guidelines is focused on increasing the 
employability of individuals, and explicitly emphasizes the aim of obtaining equal 
opportunity for women and men. Since 1999, gender mainstreaming has been put 
into concrete terms in the Employment Guidelines of the EU (see M¨ uller and 
Kurtz 2003). These guidelines emphasize the importance of the reconciliation of 
work and family life and the return to employment after family-related career 
breaks. They also contain the directive to document gender-speciﬁc eﬀects when 
evaluating labor market policy programs. 
To  increase  the  focus  of  the  survey,  we  restrict  attention  to  adult  women, 
meaning  women  aged  over 25.  Younger  individuals  often  face  diﬀerent  sets  of 
labor  market  policies,  notably  due  to  the  so-called  “comprehensive approach” 
imposed  by  the  EU.  We  also  exclude  active labor  market  policies  for  working 
individuals. 
In terms of the individual labor market outcomes, we take the pragmatic ap­
proach that we focus on the outcomes that have been deemed interesting (i.e. 
evaluated) in the literature. Most studies examine the probability of employment 
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or its determinants like the duration of unemployment or the transition rate from 
unemployment to work. Only very few studies (also) examine annual income or 
wages.  Diﬀerent  parameters  or  outcome  measures  are  informative on  diﬀerent 
aspects of labor market behavior and policy eﬀectiveness. For example, to un­
derstand the behavioral eﬀect it is more interesting to know the eﬀect on the 
transition rate from unemployment to work than to know the eﬀect on the mean 
duration of unemployment, because the latter also depends on the moment of 
treatment  exposure  and  on  the  presence  of  other  active labor  market  policies. 
Moreover, unemployment can end in a transition to non-participation, which has 
diﬀerent welfare implications than a transition into work. On the other hand, 
eﬀects on the mean unemployment duration are important from a cost-beneﬁt 
point of view, in particular for the institution paying unemployment beneﬁts. 
Eﬀects on the mean duration are also amenable to incorporate the costs due to 
the “lock-in” time spent in a program. 
We mostly restrict attention to recent studies, meaning (i) studies published 
since the period covered by the major survey in Heckman, LaLonde and Smith 
(1999), and (ii) unpublished studies based on data from after that period. This 
is  not  a  major  restriction  as  not  many  academic  studies  with  European  data 
have been published before the late 1990s, and those who have generally do not 
distinguish between gender eﬀects. 
We only consider studies that use data at the individual level. These can be 
survey data and/or  register  data.  Apart from  this,  diﬀerent studies use  diﬀer­
ent methodologies. Some use propensity score matching, others use panel data 
methods, (conditional) diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences, instrumental variables, social ex­
periments,  or  timing-of-event  (duration  analysis)  methods.  We  are  agnostic  to 
the  methods  used  in  the  studies  we  survey.  In  general  we  put  most  emphasis 
on studies published in the academic sphere, including academic working paper 
series. Of course, diﬀerent methods are sometimes not mutually compatible, or 
they provide information on diﬀerent parameters of interest (see e.g. Heckman 
and Vytlacil, 2005, for a recent overview). We should also make the obvious point 
that programs are sometimes diﬃcult to compare across countries and over time. 
Moreover, the  boundary  between  diﬀerent  sets  of  programs  is  sometimes  diﬃ­
cult to draw. Training programs sometimes include job search assistance, and 
monitoring may entail enrollment into training. 
Some important surveys of active labor market policy eﬀects have been pub­
lished in the academic literature. We already mentioned the the major survey in 
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Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999). Surveys with a focus on Europe include 
Kluve (2006). These surveys do not pay particular attention to eﬀects for women. 
Fay (1996), Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999), and Martin and Grubb (2001) 
focus on OECD countries, but their conclusions regarding gender diﬀerences are 
mostly driven by studies based on U.S. data. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss economic lines 
of reasoning that can be used to understand the policy eﬀects at the individual 
level. We also provide some aggregate statistics on women in the labor market. 
Section 3 surveys the results. Section 4 concludes and outlines some avenues for 
future research. 
2The labor  market  context 
There  is  a  large  literature  on  the  estimation  of  the  eﬀects  of  changes  in  the 
hourly wage on labor supply outcomes, notably participation and number of hours 
worked.  Such  analyses  are  closely  linked  to  neo-classical  labor  market  theory. 
In the context of continental-European labor market conditions, the results can 
be interpreted as capturing long-run eﬀects, whereas short-run and medium-run 
eﬀects are more aﬀected by labor market frictions and involuntary unemployment 
(see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). Nevertheless, this literature has drawn some 
conclusions that may be relevant for our purposes. Most importantly, female labor 
supply is much more responsive to wage changes than male labor supply. This 
applies to the hours decision for participants but even more so to the participation 
decision (see e.g. the overview in Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986, and the more 
recent  meta-study  by  Evers,  De  Mooij  and  Van  Vuuren,  2006).  Secondly,  the 
responsiveness of female labor supply seems to have decreased during the past 
decades, along with an increase in female labor force participation. 
The result that female labor supply is more responsive has been explained 
by reference to the so-called Le Chatelier principle which basically states that 
individuals with more options have more elastic supply functions. Suppose that 
women have more alternatives to devote their time to (notably, in addition to 
work and leisure, also home work including child care) than men. If the wage 
rate  increases  then  women  substitute  time  away  from  both  leisure  and  home 
work, resulting in a larger labor supply response than for men. Along these lines 
one can also explain the lower level of labor force participation among women. 
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Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) provide a formal analysis and discussion. 
This line of reasoning can also be relevant in the context of active labor market 
programs for unemployed women in a labor market with search frictions. The 
dynamic decision problem faced by an unemployed woman takes into account 
that there is an outside option of choosing to bear children and/or become a 
housewife, while a partner may provide household income. These factors may 
increase the attractiveness of not working vis-` a-vis working. Not willing to work 
does not necessarily mean that the individual is not registered as unemployed. 
One may be registered but set a reservation wage higher than the going wage, 
or have a zero search intensity. Participation in a program that increases labor 
market  opportunities,  like  a  successful  skill-enhancing  training  program,  may 
subsequently lead to job oﬀers that are acceptable and/or to a positive optimal 
job search intensity. In the long run this would lead to employment. In such cases, 
one may expect average program eﬀects to be larger for women than for men. Of 
course, if the program is completely ineﬀective then the eﬀects should be zero for 
both genders. 
If the female labor force participation is low then these issues may be more 
relevant.  First  of  all,  a  low  participation  goes  along  with  a  high  sensitivity  of 
female labor supply with respect to the wage. Secondly, the more qualiﬁed and 
potentially  productive  the  adult  female  population  is,  the  closer  actual  labor 
market conditions will be to the conditions that induce an eventual transition 
into work for many women. In Europe, historically, the average education level of 
non-participating women in economies with low female labor force participation 
was not particularly low, so that the potential for their productive participation 
was relatively high. 
A high female labor force participation goes along with lower sensitivity of fe­
male labor supply. Moreover, in such a situation, women who are non-participant 
or long-term unemployed may have on average lower skills than those in the situ­
ation of the previous paragraph. Therefore one would expect lower policy eﬀects 
than in that situation. 
A  diﬀerent  reason  for  why  active  labor  market  policies  could  work  better 
for  women  than  for  men  builds  on  the  assumption  that  many  women  have  a 
greater distance to the labor market. Because of this they may under-estimate 
their opportunities, and they may be unaware of the non-pecuniary utility of 
being employed. Program participation may then help to increase the eagerness 
to become employed. This explanation may also be more relevant in economies 
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with a relatively low female labor force participation. 
Similarly, with a high distance, employers may statistically discriminate against 
women. Active labor market policies may then provide an opportunity for em­
ployers to learn the individual productivity of a woman. This may be particularly 
relevant for employment subsidies. 
Monitoring  (i.e.,  controlling  whether  unemployed  individuals  comply  with 
rules on job search eﬀort and behavior) is diﬀerent from the other policies in 
that it necessarily reduces the individual’s expected present value (see e.g. Van 
den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006). An increase in monitoring is supposed 
to increase the transition rate to work. However, in that case, the average wage 
of the jobs will be lower. The line of reasoning earlier in this subsection leads 
one to suspect that for women it may also be attractive to respond to increased 
monitoring by way of leaving the labor force. 
In Table 1 and 2 we provide descriptive statistics on the labor force participa­
tion rates for men and women in diﬀerent countries and years. We also distinguish 
between participation in numbers of individuals on the one hand, and participa­
tion in terms of part-time versus full-time jobs on the other. In the sequel, we say 
that an economy has low female labor force participation if the gender partici­
pation gap exceeds 10 percentage points in absolute value in the year in Table 2 
closest to the years in which we observe the economy under consideration. 
3  Policy eﬀects 
3.1  Skill training 
Here, we summarize the results of 15 studies that distinguish between training 
eﬀects for women and men.1  The range of training courses that are evaluated is 
broad, but typically the courses take place in classrooms and contain some on-the­
job training aspects. Also, the program participation duration typically ranges 
from 0.5 to 1 year, although there are programs as short as 1 month and as long as 
1See Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005), Biewen et al. (2006), Bolvig, Jensen 
and Rosholm (2003), Cavaco, Foug` ere and Pouget, (2005), Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002), Kluve, 
Lehmann and Schmidt (1999), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimueller (2000), Lechner, Miquel and 
Wunsch (2004), Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2008), Lubyova and Van Ours (1999), Raaum, 
Torp and Zhang (2002a, 2002b), Richardson and Van den Berg (2006), Weber and Hofer (2004), 
and Zhang (2003). 




























71.7  79.6 
56.4  67.2  74.3 
83.2  80.9 
82.7  82.7  84.9 
85.8  84.0  84.6 
68.2  76.7  80.3 
58.0  72.6  82.0 
68.0  79.0 
94.0  92.0 
71.5  71.0 
32.1  53.6  67.9 
43.4  64.5  76.7 
74.2  79.4  82.8 
78.6  76.4 
81.1  84.0 
34.1  54.6  68.3 
88.2  86.9  85.3 
74.0  80.8 
66.8  74.1  76.8 
29.6 
24.1  30.0  34.1 
5.6  5.2 
36.7  26.2  24.3 
11.5  14.9 
21.4  24.5  23.6 
25.8  28.0  37.0 
43.0  53.0 
18.0  35.0 
5.1 
17.6  25.5  35.1 
54.5  60.2 
37.7  33.2 
17.5 
4.4  4.5 
14.3  17.2 
24.9  20.8 
44.9  45.3 
41.2  41.2  40.4 
3.8  4.8 
15.7  11.2  7.4 
4.4  9.3 
9.0  9.0  5.1 
3.6  12.5  7.6 
8.7  13.1  10.0 
7.2  10.1  9.0 
7.0  9.0 
21.0  20.0 
8.1  5.6 
8.2  13.4  3.1 
9.0  7.8  3.6 
2.5  3.8  3.3 
14.5  18.0 
11.6  17.5 
14.0  28.6  13.8 
2.3  6.8  5.2 
4.2  4.6 
9.7  6.4  3.4 
Europe  57.2  66.0  69.6  26.9  27.0  28.2  8.9  10.9  9.2 
Notes: Prime age covers ages 25–54. Part–time shares are over all ages. Labor force participation 
rate  and  unemployment  rate  for  Netherlands  is  not  available  for  2004;  2003  data  are  used 
instead. Data for the two diﬀerent parts of Germany refer to individuals aged between 35 and 
55 years and are taken from Datenreport Deutschland 2006; otherwise OECD Online Statistics 
Database 2006. 
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20.8  13.3 
37.7  24.9  16.8 
12.0  13.7 
10.3  9.2  6.4 
7.6  6.2  5.4 
27.7  18.4  13.4 
35.6  20.3  11.3 
28.0  18.0 
3.0  5.0 
15.4  14.0 
63.6  37.7  23.8 
48.5  27.8  16.7 
22.3  11.1  7.3 
12.3  11.6 
13.8  9.7 
60.5  38.5  24.2 
6.7  4.4  4.8 
23.4  14.9 
28.6  18.9  14.1 
-25.8 
-20.4  -25.5  -27.8 
-3.6  -3.7 
-28.5  -16.5  -12.7 
-5.0  -7.0 
-17.4  -19.2  -18.8 
-24.0  -25.0  -30.7 
-42.0  -49.0 
-18.0  -30.0 
-2.9 
-13.9  -19.1  -28.2 
-43.2  -45.1 
-30.0  -22.9 
-10.0 
-3.1  -3.2 
-12.0  -14.6 
-17.7  -12.3 
-38.1  -37.2 
-37.1  -34.2  -30.4 
-0.8  -1.0 
-9.6  -4.7  -1.4 
-1.8  -3.7 
-1.8  -2.3  -0.7 
0.4  3.0  -0.7 
-3.3  -3.5  -2.4 
-1.5  -3.6  0.8 
-1.0  -1.0 
-7.0  -2.0 
2.2  -0.3 
7.3  0.0  1.4 
3.2  -2.6  -0.1 
0.2  1.3  1.0 
-3.2  -2.0 
-1.2  -2.9 
0.0  -12.3  -6.9 
-0.1  2.6  0.4 
-1.1  -1.1 
-0.4  3.4  0.4 
Europe  37.5  26.8  21.9  -23.4  -22.1  -22.1  -2.0  -2.7  -1.6 
Notes: Prime age covers ages 25–54. Part–time shares are over all ages. The labor force par­
ticipation rate and unemployment rate for Netherlands are unavailable for 2004; 2003 data are 
used instead. Data for the two diﬀerent parts of Germany refer to individuals aged between 
35 and 55 years and are taken from Datenreport Deutschland 2006; otherwise OECD Online 
Statistics Database 2006. 
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3 years. Short courses are supposed to upgrade existing skill knowledge, whereas 
long courses are supposed to lead to the acquisition of skills for a completely new 
occupation. Occasionally, courses take place in practice ﬁrms or in the context of 
a regular job. 
The majority of studies (13 out of 15) ﬁnd positive eﬀects of training on labor 
market outcomes for women, for all types of training and/or averaged over all 
training types considered, or (in 3 cases) for selected types of training. Most of 
the studies focus on the employment probability or the transition rate to work as 
the outcome of interest. In many cases the eﬀects on such employment outcomes 
exceed the eﬀects for men, and often the latter are close to zero and insigniﬁcant.2 
Studies reaching these conclusions evaluate training programs in e.g. Austria in 
1999–2001, France in 1996–1997, Western Germany in 1993–1994 and 2000–2002, 
Norway in 1990–2000, or Poland in 1992–1994. As a comparison with Table 1 and 
Table 2 reveals, the female labor force participation was relatively low in these 
areas at the time of the program. The gap in labor force participation for example 
for France in 1994 was 18.6 percentage points. For Western Germany the gap in 
2004 still reached 18 percentage points, declining from as high as 28 percentage 
points in 1994. In countries like Poland and Norway the gap amounted to about 
11 percentage points in 1994. 
In  contrast,  Eastern  Germany,  Denmark  and  Sweden  enjoy  a  relative high 
female labor market participation. In these areas the gap between male and fe­
male labor force participation rate amounts to less than 10 percentage points in 
absolute  value (see  Table  2).  Evaluation studies  for  training  programs  in  these 
areas typically come to the conclusion that there are no gender speciﬁc eﬀects of 
training.3 
Thus,  positive  and  larger  eﬀects  of  training  on  employment  outcomes  for 
women compared to men go along with a larger gender gap in labor force partici­
2E.g. Biewen et al. (2006), Cavaco, Foug` ere and Pouget (2005), Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt 
(1999), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweimueller (2000), Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2004), Weber 
and Hofer (2004), and Zhang (2003). 
3See  for  example  Bergemann,  Fitzenberger  and  Speckesser  (2005),  Biewen  et  al.  (2006), 
Bolvig, Jensen, Rosholm (2003), and Richardson and Van den Berg (2006). Lechner, Miquel 
and Wunsch (2004) ﬁnd that some programs work better for women and some programs work 
better for men, but this does not necessarily violate our hypothesis, as they argue that diﬀerent 
eﬀects are connected with the men and women following diﬀerent programs. Men were often 
trained  in  construction  work  and  construction  workers  suﬀer  since  the  mid  1990s  from  an 
extremely high unemployment rate. 
9 pation. This is in agreement to the economic line of reasoning in Section 2, which 
emphasizes the importance of a shift away from home production in response to 
a productivity increase due to training.4 
It is not possible to address the question whether training programs raise the 
earnings or wages of women and whether these eﬀects are larger than for men, 
simply because too few studies investigate this issue by gender.5,6 
3.2Job search  assistance 
Job search assistance typically encompasses a variety of activities aimed at im-
proving the speed of ﬁnding a suitable job. Notably, it includes an assessment of 
the individual’s skills, counseling, teaching presentation and job search abilities, 
as well as direct referral of unemployed to job openings. The activities can take 
place in one-to-one meetings with case workers or in job clubs, or as classroom 
training. The boundary between job search assistance and skill training programs 
is somewhat ﬂuid, as job search assistance may also involve short training courses 
to upgrade certain skills. For example, a course on how to use the internet to 
search for jobs also enables the individual to use the internet in general. 
In  general,  for  each  gender,  evaluation studies  ﬁnd  favorable  eﬀects  of  job 
search assistance on the various employment outcome measures of interest, like 
the exit rate to work, the job retention rate, the employment probability, and the 
4Two studies deviate from this pattern. Switzerland has a low female labor force partic­
ipation,  but  Gerﬁn  and  Lechner  (2002)  ﬁnd  no  major  diﬀerences  between  short  run  eﬀects 
of training for men and women at the end of the 1990s. The employment probability eﬀects 
are generally negligible or even negative. It should be mentioned that Lalive, Van Ours and 
Zweim¨ uller (2000), who cover the same time period for Switzerland, ﬁnd that there are generally 
positive eﬀects for women, and larger eﬀects than for men. The second exception is Lubyova 
and Van Ours (1999) who estimate positive eﬀects of training for men and women in Slovakia, 
but the eﬀects for men are larger than for women. However, a model speciﬁcation test casts 
doubt on the validity of the speciﬁcation. 
5Raaum, Torp and Zhang (2002a, 2002b), and Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2008). 
6Adult education programs are similar to skill training programs in that they aim to enhance 
productivity and employability. We do not cover their evaluation because, ﬁrst of all, adult 
education is generally not regarded to be an active labor market policy, its participants often 
being categorized as non-labor-force-participants, and secondly, there are almost no evaluation 
studies  by  gender.  Using  recent  Swedish  data,  Albrecht,  Van  den  Berg  and  Vroman  (2004) 
ﬁnd a slightly stronger employment eﬀect for men, but the sample sizes are too small to put 
signiﬁcance to this ﬁnding. 
10 probability of not receiving beneﬁts.7  All seven studies examine economies with 
a relatively low female labor force participation. Of these, 5 (whereby one for a 
subprogram) ﬁnd larger eﬀects for women than for men.8 However, some studies 
ﬁnd similar eﬀects for men and women, or less positive eﬀects for women than 
for men, even though they also concern economies with a low female labor force 
participation.9 One of the studies also evaluates job search assistance programs in 
a setting with relatively high female labor force participation.10 This study ﬁnds 
no eﬀects on the employment probability for women but small positive eﬀects for 
men. 
3.3  Monitoring and sanctions 
In European countries, monitoring the job search eﬀort of unemployed workers, 
and punishing them ﬁnancially if they do not meet the eﬀort requirements, has 
become increasingly common (see e.g. OECD, 2000, for a survey). The monitoring 
may be purely administrative. For example, the case worker may double-check 
whether the unemployed individual has made the applications that she states to 
have made in the submitted monthly overview of job search activities. However, 
monitoring also often involves regular meetings at the UI agency or the employ­
ment oﬃce, at which recent search activities are evaluated and a plan for the next 
period is made. This may even include a directive to accept a particular open 
vacancy.  Usually  the  agencies  only  consider  samples  of  cases.  If  the  individual 
is detected not to comply with the guidelines then she may be punished with 
a sanction in the form of a beneﬁts reduction which is often combined with an 
increased monitoring rate and the threat of a more severe punishment in case 
of repeat oﬀense. A typical unemployment-beneﬁts reduction amounts to 15% of 
the beneﬁts level for a period of 2 months. 
7See Biewen et al. (2006), Cr´ epon,  Dejemeppe  and  Gurgand  (2005),  Foug` ere, Pradel and 
Roger (2005), Hujer, Thomsen and Zeiss (2006), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2000), and 
Weber and Hofer (2004). The only study reporting signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects, and this for 
both genders, is Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002). 
8Compare Biewen et al. (2006), Cr´ epon,  Dejemeppe  and  Gurgand  (2005),  Foug` ere, Pradel 
and Roger (2005), Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2000), and Weber and Hofer (2004). These 
5  studies  concern  Austria  in  2000,  France  in  the  mid  1990s  and  beginning  2000s,  Western 
Germany in the mid 2000s and Switzerland in the mid 1990s (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
9Cr´ epon, Dejemeppe and Gurgand (2005), Hujer, Thomson and Zeiss (2006), and Gerﬁn 
and Lechner (2002). 
10Eastern Germany, in Biewen et al. (2006). 
11 All studies discussed in this subsection concern economies with a relatively low 
female labor force participation. Four studies estimate gender-speciﬁc monitoring 
eﬀects.11  Their primary outcome measure is the exit rate out of unemployment. 
One of these studies ﬁnds signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of monitoring on the exit 
rate out of unemployment for both genders. One study ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive 
eﬀect  for  men  but  an  insigniﬁcant  positive  eﬀect  for  women,  and  one  ﬁnds  a 
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect for women but an insigniﬁcant positive eﬀect for men. 
The fourth study does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects for either gender, but its sample 
size is small. The studies also examine the destination state following exit out 
of unemployment, i.e. they consider exit to work and exit to non-participation 
as possible outcomes. The two studies that found signiﬁcant eﬀects on the total 
exit rate also show that the positive eﬀect on exit to work is larger for men than 
for women, whereas the positive eﬀect on exit to non-participation is larger for 
women that for men. This conﬁrms the hypothesis formulated in Section 2. In 
the two other studies, exits to non-participation are virtually absent under any 
monotoring regime considered. 
We now turn to studies on the eﬀects of imposition of a sanction. Two studies 
estimate gender-speciﬁc sanction eﬀects.12 Both take the transition rate from un­
employment to employment as the outcome measure (exits to other destinations 
are virtually absent in their data). They ﬁnd that upon imposition of a sanction, 
the transition rate jumps to a signiﬁcantly higher level, for men as well as women. 
One study ﬁnds larger eﬀect for women, whereas the other ﬁnds similar eﬀects 
for men as for single mothers. The order of magnitude of the eﬀect is often such 
that the transition rate doubles. Such eﬀects are substantial, and they indicate 
that the individuals are responsive to monetary incentives. To put this diﬀerently, 
the re-employment rate can be increased among individuals who are at risk of a 
sanction if one tightens the monitoring or the search eﬀort conditions for beneﬁts 
entitlement. The eﬀect does not vanish after beneﬁts are restored to their previ­
ous level, so presumably the threat of severe additional sanctions plays a major 
role in the magnitude of the eﬀect. Indeed, recidivism seems to be rare. 
11Dolton and O’Neill (2002), Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006), Micklewright and 
Nagy (2005), and McVicar (2006). 
12Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours (2004) and Abbring, Van den Berg and Van 
Ours (2005). 
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3.4  Employment subsidies 
Employment subsidies arguably constitute the most heterogeneous group of poli­
cies. They encompass (i) direct job creation schemes in the public and non-proﬁt 
sectors,  (ii)  hiring  subsidies  for  private-sector employers  if  they  hire  an  unem­
ployed worker, and (iii) start-up grants for unemployed individuals who set up 
their own business. Typically these measures are temporary, in contrast to em­
ployment tax credits for which in general no time limits are imposed (for a com­
parison, see for example Blundell and Meghir, 2001). Job creation schemes and 
hiring subsidies are not necessarily expected to lead to a permanent job with the 
same employer. The studies we survey mostly focus on the employment proba­
bility and the transition rate out of unemployment for women as outcomes of 
interest. 
We ﬁrst summarize the results from the four studies estimating gender-speciﬁc 
eﬀects of hiring subsidies for private-sector employers.13  All of the four studies 
ﬁnd  positive eﬀects  for  women.  The  data  are  all  from  economies  with  a  rela­
tively low female labor force participation. The estimated eﬀects for men never 
exceed those for women. However, in two of the four cases the estimated eﬀect 
for men is similarly positive. In the two other cases, the estimates for men show 
a signiﬁcantly negative impact on their employment chances. 
One study considers start-up grants.14  This study, with data from Western 
Germany, ﬁnds that grants with a length of 0.5 to 3 years increase the employment 
probability for men and women. The eﬀect for women is larger. 
Finally, we turn to job creation schemes. Let us ﬁrst review the results for 
economies with a relatively low female labor force participation. Six studies satisfy 
this condition.15 The results are mixed, and this perhaps reﬂects the huge amount 
of heterogeneity of the various job creation programs in terms of the types of jobs 
created and the guidance. The estimates range from signiﬁcantly positive with 
respect  to  the  exit  rate  to  work  to  signiﬁcantly  negative  with  respect  to  the 
13Gerﬁn  and  Lechner  (2002),  Gerﬁn,  Lechner  and  Steiger  (2005),  Kluve,  Lehmann  and 
Schmidt (1999), and Zhang (2003). Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2000) and Bolvig, Jensen 
and Rosholm (2003) do not distinguish between job creation schemes and hiring subsidies. The 
latter two studies ﬁnd a positive eﬀect for women and a smaller positive eﬀect for men. 
14Baumgartner and Caliendo 2006. 
15Gerﬁn  and  Lechner  (2002),  Gerﬁn,  Lechner  and  Steiger  (2005),  Hujer,  Caliendo  and 
Thompsen (2004, 2006), Van Ours (2004), and Zhang (2003). See also footnote 13 concern­
ing Lalive, Van Ours and Zweim¨ uller (2000). 
13 employment probability. There is also no clear pattern in the gender diﬀerence: 
it can be positive, zero, or negative. 
Four studies estimate individual employment eﬀects of job creation schemes 
in Eastern Germany.16 These four, together with the one study with Danish data 
that merges job creation schemes and hiring subsidies,17 represent the only studies 
of employment subsidy policies in economies with a relatively high labor force 
participation.  All  ﬁve reach  the  conclusion  that  the  eﬀects  are  more  favorable 
for women than for men. The estimated eﬀects for women range from a strong 
reduction in the unemployment probability to a slight increase in the conditional 
probability of exiting nonemployment. However, at least part of the reduction in 
the unemployment probability in Eastern Germany is due to women leaving the 
labor force. The estimated eﬀects for men do not all have the same sign. 
The results for hiring subsidies and start-up subsidies are in line with the 
results in the rest of the paper. The ﬁndings for job creation are somewhat out 
of  line  with  these.  Job  creation  programs  seem  to  perform  uniformly  well  for 
women in economies with a high labor force participation, in the sense that they 
leave unemployment faster, and that they beneﬁt more from the program than 
men. There are some possible explanations. First, participation in a job creation 
programs may help to overcome statistical discrimination by employers against 
individual women. Observation of the woman’s performance in a created job may 
provide an opportunity for employers to learn the individual productivity of a 
woman. This may be particularly relevant in an economy with a high female labor 
force participation, because employers may then feel that unemployed women in 
particular constitute a pool of “bad draws” from the productivity distribution. 
Secondly, all studies on which this result is based except one concern Eastern 
Germany, so the result may be a speciﬁcity of the Eastern German situation. 
Indeed, women in East Germany seem to move relatively often to labor-market­
non-participation after participation in a job creation program. 
4  Conclusions 
The results in the empirical literature are remarkably uniform. In general, active 
labor market policies have a positive eﬀect on employment outcomes for women. 
16Bergemann (2005), Eichler and Lechner (2002), and Hujer, Caliendo and Thompsen (2004, 
2006). 
17Bolvig, Jensen and Rosholm (2003). 
14 Moreover, the eﬀects are larger than for men, in particular in economies with a 
relatively low female labor force participation. These conclusions are strongest 
for skill-training programs. Thus, positive and larger eﬀects of training on em­
ployment outcomes for women compared to men go along with a larger gender 
gap in labor force participation. This is in agreement to the economic line of 
reasoning  in  Section  2,  which  emphasizes  the  importance  of  a  shift  away  from 
home production in response to productivity increases due to training. For job 
search assistance programs, hiring subsidies, and start-up grants, the conclusions 
are similar. With female labor force participation increasing in a given economy 
over time, one may expect the eﬀectiveness of these active labor market policies 
to  decrease  for  women,  into  the  direction  of  the  more  limited  eﬀectiveness for 
men.  For  men,  job  search  assistance  programs  seem  to  be  more  eﬀective than 
skill-training programs. 
Monitoring also aﬀects women’s exit rate out of unemployment. The size of 
the eﬀect is on average more or less equal to that for men, but the exit desti­
nation is more often non-participation for women and employment for men. Job 
creation program participation also sometimes leads to a higher exit into non­
participation for women. In the light of the general ﬁndings for other programs, 
job creation programs perform remarkably well for women in economies with a 
high labor force participation, in the sense that they leave unemployment faster 
and that they beneﬁt more from the program than men. We conjecture that this 
is because participation in job creation programs may help to overcome statistical 
discrimination by employers against individual women. 
We ﬁnish by pointing out a direction for further research. Evaluation stud­
ies are often unable to address over-all welfare eﬀects of program participation. 
For  example,  monitoring  presumably  leads  to  a  lower  average  productivity  of 
accepted jobs; employment subsidies in the private sector may crowd out other 
potential workers; and training programs have lock-in eﬀects that may be hard 
to quantify. Such eﬀects mitigate any positive treatment eﬀects. In general, total 
program participation costs are diﬃcult to observe as well. These diﬃculties are 
of course not restricted to evaluation studies by gender. In general, comprehensive 
register data on wages, hours, job application procedures, and the functioning of 
employment oﬃces, may help to overcome some of these problems. What adds to 
the evaluation problems for women is that the line between being registered as 
unemployment and being non-participant in the labor market is often thin. This 
implies that potential program participants may be untraceable in data sets of la­
15
bor market participants. Moreover, policy eﬀects may have an eﬀect of household 
members’ labor market outcomes. It seems useful to therefore link the evaluation 
data to registers on family members’ outcomes. 
16
References 
Abbring,  J.H.,  G.J.  van  den  Berg,  and  J.C.  van  Ours  (2005),  “The  eﬀect  of 
unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment 
to employment”, Economic Journal, 115, 602–630. 
Albrecht, J.W.,  G.J. van den Berg, and S.B. Vroman (2004),  “The Knowledge 
Lift: The Swedish adult education program that aimed to eliminate low worker 
skill levels”, Working paper, IFAU, Uppsala. 
Baumgartner,  H.J.  and  M.  Caliendo  (2006),  “Turning  unemployed  into  self– 
employed: The relative eﬀectiveness of two programmes in West Germany”, 
mimeo, DIW, Berlin. 
Bergemann, A. (2005), “Do job creation schemes initiate positive dynamic em­
ployment  eﬀects?  Evidence  from  East  Germany?”,  mimeo,  Free  University 
Amsterdam, Amsterdam. 
Bergemann, A., B. Fitzenberger, and S. Speckesser (2005), “Evaluating the dy­
namic employment eﬀects of training programs in East Germany using condi­
tional diﬀerence–in–diﬀerences”, Working paper, IZA, Bonn. 
Biewen, M., B. Fitzenberger, A. Osikominu, and M. Waller (2006), “Employment 
eﬀects of short and medium term further training programs in Germany in the 
early 2000s”, mimeo, Goethe University Frankfurt, Frankfurt am Main. 
Blundell,  R.  and  C.  Meghir  (2001),  “Active  labour  market  policy  vs  employ­
ment tax credits: Lessons from recent UK reforms”, Swedish Economic Policy 
Review, 8, 239–265. 
Bolvig, I., P. Jensen, and M. Rosholm (2003), “The employment eﬀects of active 
social policy”, Working paper, Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus. 
Cahuc, P. and A. Zylberberg (2004), Labor economics, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Cavaco, S., D. Foug` ere, and J. Pouget (2005), “Estimating the eﬀect of a retrain­
ing  program  for  displaced  workers  on  their  transition  to  permanent  jobs”, 
W o r k i n gp a p e r ,I Z A ,B o n n . 
Cr´ epon,  B.,  M.  Dejemeppe,  and  M.  Gurgand  (2005),  “Counseling  the  unem­
ployed: Does it lower unemployment duration and recurrence?”, Working pa­
per, IZA, Bonn. 
17 Dolton, P. and D. O’Neill (2002), “The long-run eﬀects of unemployment monitor­
ing and work search programmes”, Journal of Labor Economics, 20, 381–403. 
Eichler, M. and M. Lechner (2002), “An evaluation of public employment pro­
grammes in the East German state of Sachsen-Anhalt”, Labour Economics,9 , 
143–186. 
Evers, M., R.A. de Mooij, and D.J. van Vuuren (2006), “What explains the vari­
ation in estimates of labour supply elasticities?”, Working paper, Tinbergen 
Institute, Amsterdam. 
Fay, R.G. (1996), “Enhancing the eﬀectiveness of active labour market policies: 
Evidence from programme evaluations in OECD countries”, Working paper, 
OECD, Paris. 
Foug` ere, D., J. Pradel, and M. Roger (2005), “Does job–search assistance af­
fect search eﬀort and outcomes? A microeconometric analysis of public versus 
private search methods”, Working paper, IZA, Bonn. 
Gerﬁn, M. and M. Lechner (2002), “A microeconometric evaluation of the active 
labour market policy in Switzerland”, Economic Journal, 112, 854–893. 
Gerﬁn, M., M. Lechner, and H. Steiger (2005), “Does subsidised temporary em­
ployment get the unemployed back to work? An econometric analysis of two 
diﬀerent schemes”, Labour Economics, 12, 807–835. 
Heckman, J.J., R.J. LaLonde, and J.A. Smith (1999), “The economics and econo­
metrics of active labor market programs”, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, ed­
itors, Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume III, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Heckman, J.J. and E.J. Vytlacil (2005), “Structural equations, treatment eﬀects 
and econometric policy evaluation”, Econometrica, 73, 669–738. 
Hujer, T., M. Caliendo, and S. Thomsen (2004), “New evidence on the eﬀects 
of job creation schemes in Germany – A matching approach with threefold 
heterogeneity”, Research in Economics, 257–302. 
Hujer, T., M. Caliendo, and S. Thomsen (2006), “Identfying eﬀect heterogene­
ity  to  improve  the  eﬃciency  of  job  creation  schemes  in  germany”,  Applied 
Economics, forthcoming. 
Hujer, T., S. Thomsen, and C. Zeiss (2006), “The eﬀects of short–term train­
ing measures on the individual unemployment duration in West Germany”, 
Working paper, IZA, Mannheim. 
18 Killingsworth,  M.R.  and  J.J.  Heckman  (1986),  “Female  labor  supply:  A  sur­
vey”, in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, editors, Handbook of Labor Economics, 
North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Kluve, J.  (2006),  “The  eﬀectiveness of  European  active labor  market  policy”, 
Working paper, RIW, Essen. 
Kluve, J., H. Lehmann, and C.M. Schmidt (1999), “Active labor market policies 
in Poland: Human capital enhancement, stigmatisation, or beneﬁt churning”, 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 27, 61–89. 
Lalive, R., J.C. van Ours, and J. Zweim¨ uller (2000), “The impact of active labor 
market programs on the duration of unemployment”, Working paper, IZA, 
Bonn. 
Lechner, M., R. Miquel, and C. Wunsch (2008), “The curse and blessing of train­
ing the unemployed in a changing economy: The case of East Germany after 
uniﬁcation”, German Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Lechner, M., T. Miquel, and C. Wunsch (2004), “Long–run eﬀects of public sector 
sponsored training in West Germany”, Working paper, University St. Gallen, 
SIAW, St. Gallen. 
Lubyova, M. and J.C. van Ours (1999), “Eﬀects of active labor market programs 
on  the  transition  rate  from  unemployment  into  regular  jobs  in  the  Slovak 
Republic”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 27, 90–112. 
Martin, J.P. and D. Grubb (2001), “What works and for whom: a review of OECD 
countries’ experiences with active labour market policies”, Swedish Economic 
Policy Review, 8, 9–56. 
McVicar, D. (2006), “Job search monitoring intensity and unemployment exit: 
Evidence from a jobseeker’s allowance natural experiment”, Working paper, 
Queen’s University, Belfast. 
Micklewright, J. and G. Nagy (2005), “Job search monitoring and unemployment 
duration in Hungary: evidence from a randomised control trial”, Working pa­
per, University of Southampton, Southampton. 
M¨ uller, P. and B. Kurtz (2003), “Active labour market policy and gender main­
streaming in germany”, Working paper, IAB, N¨ urnberg. 
OECD (2000), Employment Outlook 2000, OECD, Paris. 
19 Raaum, O., H. Torp, and T. Zhang (2002a), “Business cycles and the impact of 
labour market programmes”, Working paper, University of Oslo, Oslo. 
Raaum, O., H. Torp, and T. Zhang (2002b), “Do individual programme eﬀects 
exceed the costs? Norwegian evidence on long run eﬀects of labour market 
training”, Working paper, University of Oslo, Oslo. 
Richardson, K. and G.J. van den Berg (2006), “Swedish labor market training 
and the duration of unemployment”, Working paper, IZA, Bonn. 
Van den Berg, G.J. and B. van der Klaauw (2006), “Counseling and monitoring 
of unemployed workers: Theory and evidence from a controlled social experi­
ment”, International Economic Review, 47, forthcoming. 
Van  den  Berg,  G.J.,  B.  van der  Klaauw,  and  J.C.  van Ours  (2004),  “Punitive 
sanctions  and  the  transition  rate  from  welfare  to  work”,  Journal  of  Labor 
Economics, 22, forthcoming. 
Van  Ours,  J.C.  (2004),  “The  locking–in  eﬀect  of  subsidized  jobs”,  Journal  of 
Comparative Economics, 32, 37–55. 
Weber, A. and H. Hofer (2004), “Are job search programs a promising tool? A 
microeconomic evaluation for Austria”, Working paper, IZA, Bonn. 
Zhang, T. (2003), “Identifying treamtment eﬀects of active labour market pro­
grammes for Norwegian adults”, mimeo, University of Oslo, Oslo. 
20
Publication series published by the Institute for Labour 
Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)  –  latest issues 
Rapporter/Reports 
2006:1  Zenou Yves, Olof Åslund & John Östh ”Hur viktig är närheten till jobb för 
chanserna på arbetsmarknaden?” 
2006:2  Mörk Eva, Linus Lindqvist & Daniela Lundin ”Påverkar maxtaxan inom
barnomsorgen hur mycket föräldrar arbetar?” 
2006:3  Hägglund Pathric ”Anvisningseffekter” – finns dom? Resultat från tre 
arbetsmarknadspolitiska  experiment” 
2006:4  Hägglund Pathric ”A description of three randomised experiments in
Swedish labour market policy” 
2006:5  Forslund Anders & Oskar Nordström Skans “(Hur) hjälps ungdomar av
arbetsmarknadspolitiska program för unga?”
2006:6  Johansson Per & Olof Åslund ”’Arbetsplatsintroduktion för vissa invandrare’
– teori, praktik och effekter” 
2006:7  Calleman Catharina ”Regleringen av arbetsmarknad och anställningsförhål-
landen för hushållstjänster” 
2006:8  Nordström Skans Oskar, Per-Anders Edin & Bertil Holmlund ”Löneskillna-
der i svenskt näringsliv 1985–2000”
2006:9  Engström Per, Hesselius Patrik & Malin Persson ”Överutnyttjande i tillfällig
föräldrapenning för vård av barn” 
2006:10  Holmlund Bertil, Qian Liu & Oskar Nordström Skans ”Utbildning nu eller
senare? Inkomsteffekter av uppskjuten högskoleutbildning”
2006:11  Sibbmark Kristina & Olof Åslund ”Vad för vem och hur gick den sen? En 
kartläggning av arbetsförmedlingarnas insatser för utrikes födda under 2005” 
2006:12  Fredriksson Peter & Björn Öckert ”Är det bättre att börja skolan tidigare?”
2006:13  Sibbmark Kristina ”Arbetsmarknadspolitisk översikt 2005” 
2006:14  Wang Iris J Y, Kenneth Carling & Ola Nääs ”Är kommunala sommarjobb en
gräddfil till arbetsmarknaden?” 
2006:15  Söderström Martin ”Betygsintagning och elevers studieframgång i
Stockholms gymnasieskolor”
2006:16  Johansson Kerstin ” Arbetskraftsdeltagande och arbetsmarknadspolitiska
program”
2007:1  Lundin Daniela ”Subventionerade anställningar för unga – en uppföljning av
allmänt anställningsstöd för 20–24-åringar” 
   2007:2  Lundin Daniela, Eva Mörk & Björn Öckert ”Maxtaxan inom barnomsorgen –
påverkar den hur mycket föräldrar arbetar?”
2007:3  Bergemann Annette & Gerard van den Berg ”Effekterna av aktiv arbetsmark-
nadspolitik för kvinnor i Europa – en översikt” 
Working Papers 
2006:1  Åslund Olof, John Östh & Yves Zenou “How important is access to jobs?
Old question – improved answer” 
2006:2 Hägglund Pathric “Are there pre-programme effects of Swedish active 
labour market policies? Evidence from three randomised experiments” 
2006:3  Johansson Per “Using internal replication to establish a treatment effect” 
2006:4  Edin Per-Anders & Jonas Lagerström “Blind dates: quasi-experimental 
evidence on discrimination” 
2006:5  Öster Anna “Parental unemployment and children’s school performance” 
2006:6  Forslund Anders & Oskar Nordström Skans “Swedish youth labour market
policies revisited”
2006:7  Åslund Olof & Per Johansson “Virtues of SIN – effects of an immigrant
workplace introduction program” 
2006:8  Lalive Rafael “How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration? A 
regression discontinuity approach” 
2006:9  Nordström Skans Oskar, Per-Anders Edin & Bertil Holmlund “Wage disper-
sion between and within plants: Sweden 1985–2000” 
2006:10  Korkeamäki Ossi & Roope Uusitalo “Employment effects of a payroll-tax 
cut – evidence from a regional tax exemption experiment”
2006:11  Holmlund Bertil, Qian Liu & Oskar Nordström Skans “Mind the gap? Esti-
mating the effects of postponing higher education” 
2006:12  Fredriksson Peter & Björn Öckert “Is early learning really more productive?
The effect of school starting age on school and labor market performance” 
2006:13  Pekkarinen Tuomas, Sari Pekkala & Roope Uusitalo ”Educational policy 
and intergenerational income mobility: evidence from the Finnish compre-
hensive school reform” 
2006:14  Wang Iris J Y, Kenneth Carling & Ola Nääs “High school students’ summer 
jobs and their ensuing labour market achievement” 
2006:15  de Jong Philip, Maarten Lindeboom & Bas van der Klaauw “Screening dis-
ability insurance applications” 
   2006:16  Söderström Martin “School choice and student achievement – new evidence
on open-enrolment” 
2006:17 Johansson Kerstin “Do labor market flows affect labor-force participation?” 
2007:1  de Luna Xavier & Per Johansson “Matching estimators for the effect of a
treatment on survival times”
2007:2  Lundin Daniela, Eva Mörk & Björn Öckert “Do reduced child care prices
make parents work more?”
2007:3  Bergemann Annette & Gerard van den Berg “Active labor market policy
effects for women in Europe – a survey” 
Dissertation Series 
2006:1  Hägglund Pathric “Natural and classical experiments in Swedish labour 
market policy” 
2006:2  Savvidou Eleni “Technology, human capital and labor demand” 
2006:3  Söderström Martin “Evaluating institutional changes in education and wage
policy”
2006:4  Lagerström Jonas “Discrimination, sickness absence, and labor market
policy” 
2006:5  Johansson Kerstin “ Empirical essays on labor-force participation, matching, 
and trade” 
   